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INTRODUCTION
From October 2009 to February 2010, Alex Footman worked as a production
intern on the Oscar-winning film Black Swan, where he spent his days
filling coffee pots, taking out the trash, getting lunch for the staff, and
cleaning floors.1 Black Swan went on to make more than $300 million, but
Footman, a graduate of Wesleyan University’s well-known film studies
program, received no compensation.2 When asked whether he had gained
experience from the position, Alex replied, “The only thing I learned on this
internship was to be more picky in choosing employment opportunities.”3
Diana Wang is also no stranger to unpaid internships. In trying to break
into competitive industries like publishing and public relations, she went
through seven.4 Her most recent stint was at Harper’s Bazaar, and she described her time there as “disgusting.”5 Her normal workday consisted of
shipping merchandise between New York and London, carrying heavy bags
throughout Manhattan, working through dinner, and finally leaving the
office at around 10 PM.6 She even served a management function at the
company, overseeing eight other interns.7 Yet she, like them, made nothing.8
The banality and lack of value in the work given to unpaid interns is a
common complaint. Marra Green, for example, had an unpaid internship at
the Diane von Furstenberg fashion house in Manhattan, where she felt “as if
she was . . . her boss’s valet.”9 In discussing her internship, Ms. Green said, “I
did a lot of lunch runs. I also did some weird personal errands. I picked up
clothes which my boss ordered from the store. I returned her children’s clothes
to various stores. I went to Barneys to pick up Christmas presents . . . .”10
† Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 162. J.D. Candidate, 2014,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2011, Villanova University. I am grateful to
Professor Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Kirsten Boreen, Sarah Besnoff, and Chris Martin for their help in
editing this Comment. All errors are, of course, my own.
1 Steven Greenhouse, Interns, Unpaid by a Studio, File Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at B3.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Josh Sanburn, The Beginning of the End of the Unpaid Internship, TIME (May 2, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/05/02/the-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-unpaid-internship-as-weknow-it.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Steven Greenhouse, The Uses and Misuses of Unpaid Internships, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/the-uses-and-misuses-of-unpaid-internships.
10 Id. Stories like these, however, are not limited to recent graduates or current students.
Kristina Shands is thirty-eight and lost her job in the hard-hit nonprofit industry during the
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This year, some unpaid interns have begun to fight back.11 Footman and
another intern who worked on Black Swan won a lawsuit in federal court
against Fox Searchlight Pictures.12 They alleged that the production company
violated minimum wage and overtime laws by not compensating more than
one hundred interns.13 The complaint stated, “Fox Searchlight’s unpaid
interns are a crucial labor force on its productions, functioning as production
assistants and bookkeepers and performing secretarial and janitorial
work. . . . Fox Searchlight has denied them the benefits that the law affords
to employees . . . .”14 Similarly, Diana Wang and her fellow interns filed a
class-action lawsuit against the Hearst Corporation, which owns Harper’s
Bazaar, in which they claimed that Hearst’s treatment of its interns violated
federal and state labor laws.15
While these two lawsuits against major corporations are the most prominent, similar claims are certain to arise as the pool of unpaid interns keeps
growing and as interns continue to become disgruntled after their unsatisfying,
uncompensated experiences.16 Yet when judges finally hear these cases, they
will have little case law and only vague instructions from the Department of
Labor to guide them.17
My proposal is that, in assessing unpaid internship cases, judges should
borrow the doctrine of consideration from contract law to decide whether there
really is an employment relationship. Under such a system, if the employer
and intern exchanged mutually induced promises, then an employment
relationship exists that requires (1) at least the minimum wage in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act18 and (2) the typical employee
protections against harassment and discrimination in compliance with the
recession. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Working for Free: The Boom in Adult Interns, TIME (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1977130,00.html. In an effort to find employment in a different field, she began interning with the Knoxville Ice Bears hockey team, distributing programs and writing game summaries—for free. Id.
11 See Greenhouse, supra note 1; Sanburn, supra note 4.
12 Steven Greenhouse, Judge Rules That Movie Studio Should Have Been Paying Interns, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2013, at B1.
13 Greenhouse, supra note 1.
14 Complaint ¶ 3, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11-6784, 2013 WL 2495140
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013).
15 Sanburn, supra note 4. Marra Green, as of the time of this writing, appears not to have
taken legal action.
16 See infra Section I.B. At least one law firm, Schneider & Rubin, LLC, seems poised to try
to capitalize on this emerging field of litigation. Schneider & Rubin, LLC, Schneider & Rubin, LLC
Company Profile, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/company/internlaw-com-schneider-&-rubin-llc
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013) (profiling a new law firm, Schneider & Rubin, LLC, which will be
dedicated to litigation on behalf of interns).
17 See infra Section I.B.
18 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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Civil Rights Act,19 Americans with Disabilities Act,20 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.21
In this Comment, I discuss the need for, details of, and advantages of
my proposal. In Part I, I provide a background of unpaid internships in the
United States to display their pervasiveness and their negative effects on
our country. In Part II, I lay out the test I propose judges use when determining the legality of unpaid internships. In Part III, I demonstrate how
this test will work in the courts by applying it to six concrete examples that
range from the clearest illegal scenario to the clearest legal scenario. Finally,
in Part IV, I discuss and counter potential challenges to my proposal.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF UNPAID INTERNSHIPS
A. Origins
Any history of unpaid internships must begin with the passage of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),22 in 1938, which President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt called “the most farsighted program for the benefit of
workers ever adopted.”23 Passed during the Great Depression in response to
injustices to the working class,24 this monumental piece of legislation had
three primary objectives:
to establish minimum wages, to discourage the employment of workers for long
hours by providing that wage payments for all hours in excess of the statutory
maximum shall be at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular
rate, and to discourage the employment of oppressive child labor.25

The Act’s overarching purpose is to ensure a “minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being . . . without substantially
curtailing employment.”26 For this Comment, the most relevant provisions
19 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V
2012) (protecting employees and job applicants from employment discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin).
20 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
21 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
22 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
23 Laura Fitzpatrick, The Minimum Wage, TIME (July 24, 2009), http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1912408,00.html.
24 Jonathan Grossman, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Maximum Struggle for a Minimum
Wage, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1978, at 22, 26 (noting that proponents of the bill wanted to
end oppressive child labor and unnecessarily long working hours).
25 Edwin M. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941–1945, 59 HARV. L.
REV. 321, 321 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
26 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)–(b).
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of the FLSA are the definitions of employee, the minimum wage, 27 and the
one and one half–time overtime rate.28
The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”29 “Employ,” under the FLSA, means “to suffer or permit to work.”30
The Supreme Court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,31 however, narrowed
this definition so that “‘employ’ does not make all persons employees who,
without any express or implied compensation agreement, may work for their
own advantage on the premises of another.”32 In response to heightened
criticism of unpaid internships, the Department of Labor released Fact Sheet
#71 (the Fact Sheet) to clarify when an intern is an “employee” deserving
minimum wage and overtime rates.33
According to the Act, “an employer [must] pay the prescribed minimum
wage ‘to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce.’”34 The intent here “was to insure that
every person whose employment contemplated compensation should not be
compelled to sell his services for less than the prescribed minimum wage.”35
Thus, if an intern is an “employee” under the meaning of the FLSA, she is
entitled to the minimum wage of $7.25 per hour36 and one and one-half
times that rate if she works more than forty hours per week.37

27
28
29
30
31
32

Id. § 206.
Id. § 207.
Id. § 203(e)(1).
Id. § 203(g).
330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947).
See Letter from Wage and Hour Division, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, FLSA2004-5NA (May 17, 2004)
[hereinafter Letter from Wage and Hour Division] (addressee’s name omitted for privacy purposes),
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSANA/2004/2004_05_17_05FLSA_NA_ internship.pdf.
33 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/
regs/compliance/whdfs71.htm [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. For a detailed discussion of the Fact
Sheet, see infra Section I.B.
34 Dodd, supra note 25, at 324 (citation omitted).
35 Walling, 330 U.S. at 152.
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 2012) (declaring that the current minimum wage is
$7.25 per hour); see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 23 (noting the historical minimum wage rates).
37 See FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“Interns in the ‘for-profit’ private sector who qualify as
employees rather than trainees typically must be paid at least the minimum wage and overtime
compensation for hours worked over forty in a workweek.”).
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B. Description of the Current State of the Law
The number of unpaid internships has been increasing since the recession.38
Unpaid internships have tended to be most popular in industries like media,
communications, entertainment, and publishing. In such fields, industry
experiences and achievements are necessary qualifications for a job.39
Moreover, unpaid internships are particularly prevalent among small
businesses, “which often look to save money while benefiting from the
productivity of the students they hire.”40
Exactly how many unpaid internships have been added since the recession,
or even the exact number of unpaid interns currently working, however, is
difficult to calculate because the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor
Statistics does not track the number of unpaid internships.41 Despite this
empirical deficiency, the United States saw increasing skepticism of unpaid
internships, beginning in early 2010. Most notably, President Obama’s
Administration called unpaid internships “abusive and unfair because lessaffluent students can’t afford to spend a summer working as an unpaid
intern.”42 Additionally, in April 2010, the Economic Policy Institute
38 See Steven Greenhouse, The Unpaid Intern, Legal or Not, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2010, at B1
(stating that “[e]mployers posted 643 unpaid internships on Stanford’s job board in [the 2009–
2010] academic year, more than triple the 174 posted two years [prior]”); Tahmnicioglu, supra note
10 (noting that both Monster.com and Careerbuilder.com have seen increases in the number of
unpaid internships since the recession); see also Adam Barnosky, Labor of Love: Unpaid Internships in
the Music Industry, PERFORMER MAG. (Sept. 17, 2012), http://performermag.com/labor-of-loveunpaid-internships-in-the-music-industry (noting that in the music industry, “[t]he prevalence of
‘unpaid’ internships has increased over the past several years”); Nicholas Pologeorgis, The Impact
Unpaid Internships Have on the Labor Market, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 14, 2012),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/12/impact-of-unpaid-internships.asp (listing new
internship coordinators and consultants and the economic recession as some of the reasons for this
exponential growth).
39 See Kaitlin Madden, The Ongoing Debate over Unpaid Internships, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-14/classified/chi-unpaid-internship-rules-20120214_1_
unpaid-internships-companies-in-competitive-industries-past-interns (quoting Heather Huhman,
founder of the public relations firm Come Recommended, as stating that “[u]npaid internships are
common in media, communications, writing, and other creative fields” because these fields rely
more on experience).
40 Peter W. Fulham, Unpaid Interns and Labor Laws: Gaining Experience, Enduring Abuse, POL.
DAILY (May 12, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/05/12/unpaid-interns-labor-laws-studentsexperience-abuse.
41 See id. (“There is no official count of unpaid interns in the U.S. . . . .”); Stephanie Steinberg, Unpaid Internships Can Cost—or Pay Off for—College Students, USA TODAY ( July 26, 2010),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-07-27-internship27_ST_N.htm (“The Department
of Labor and the Bureau of Labor Statistics do not track the number of paid and unpaid internships.”).
42 Brann & Isaacson, Hiring Unpaid Interns: Advice for Employers, 16 EMP. L. LETTER, Aug. 2011, at
4; see also Greenhouse, supra note 38 (quoting Nancy J. Leppink, the acting director of the
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launched a comprehensive critique of unpaid internships on three distinct
grounds: (1) a majority of interns are unprotected against harassment and
discrimination because they do not qualify as employees, and therefore are
not afforded employee protections; (2) the current state of the law promotes
the growth of unpaid internships, which are often limited to wealthy individuals who can afford to work for free; and (3) the availability of “free labor”
encourages employers to replace regular employees with unpaid interns.43
In response to these criticisms and to increased scrutiny by state governments of unpaid internships,44 in April 2010, the Department of Labor
released the Fact Sheet to clarify when an unpaid intern is an “employee”
who must be paid under the FLSA.45 This report is meant to restate the
pertinent law as promulgated in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.46 and the
FLSA—not to reflect a change to existing law and jurisprudence regarding
unpaid internships.47 Furthermore, though these guidelines are not as
authoritative as the FLSA or a court ruling, Judge Pauley in Glatt v. Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc.—the only case yet to address the issue of unpaid
internships—held that the Fact Sheet was “entitled to deference” and
adopted the entire six-point test in his opinion.48
For an unpaid internship to be legal under the Fact Sheet, it must adhere
to the following six criteria:
1.

The internship, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities
of the employer, is similar to training which would be given in an educational environment;

2.

The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern;

Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, who said that there are few circumstances where a
for-profit employer can offer unpaid internships and “still be in compliance with the law”).
43 See Kathryn Anne Edwards & Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Not-So-Equal Protection: Reforming the Regulation of Student Internships, POL’Y MEMORANDUM (Econ. Pol'y Inst., Washington,
D.C.), Apr. 9, 2010, at 1, available at http://epi.3cdn.net/f7d635c82f7380fff0_8sm6bxrzk.pdf.
44 See Greenhouse, supra note 38 (stating that officials in Oregon, California, and other states
have increased investigations of unpaid internships and fined employers).
45 FACT SHEET, supra note 33.
46 330 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1947) (holding that the word “employ” does not make all persons who
work on another’s premises “employees” and outlining the “trainee” exception).
47 See Steinberg, supra note 41 (“The U.S. Department of Labor, concerned about companies
taking advantage of interns, reissued guidelines in the spring that have been in effect since 1947,
when the Supreme Court established rules under the Fair Labor Standards Act that employers
must follow to offer unpaid internships.”).
48 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11-6784, 2013 WL 2495140, at *12 (S.D.N.Y June
11, 2013) (stating that the Fact Sheet’s factors have “support in Walling” and “are entitled to
deference”). It is unclear whether judges in future cases will adopt the Fact Sheet, as Judge Pauley
did, or stray from it.
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3.

The intern does not displace regular employees, but works under close
supervision of existing staff;

4.

The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations
may actually be impeded;

5.

The intern is not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the
internship; and

6.

The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled
to wages for the time spent in the internship.49

If an internship does not satisfy these criteria, the intern is an “employee,”
not a “trainee.”50 These criteria apply only to for-profit firms; interns at
nonprofit organizations are classified as volunteers under the FLSA and are
thereby excluded.51
An important aspect of this test is that it is conjunctive—that is, every
prong must be satisfied for the intern not to be classified as “employed.”52
The language of the test appears to place the burden of proof on the
defendant. The Fact Sheet states that “[i]nternships in the ‘for-profit’ private
sector will most often be viewed as employment, unless the test described
[above] relating to trainees is met.”53 The word “unless” seems to indicate
that internships in the for-profit sector are presumed to be employment, and
the defendant can rebut this presumption only by showing that its internship
program adheres to the six-prong test.

49

FACT SHEET, supra note 33; see also Are Unpaid Internships Legal in Ontario?, ONTARIO MINISLAB. (2011), available at http://www.labour.gov.on.ca/english/es/pubs/is_unpaidintern.php
(putting forth almost identical criteria for the legality of unpaid internships in Ontario, Canada).
50 Because the intern is an “employee,” he is entitled at least to a minimum wage and overtime rates. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring that employees be paid at least
the minimum wage); FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“[I]ndividuals who are ‘suffered or permitted’
to work must be compensated under the law for the services they perform for an employer.”).
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(4)(A) (excluding unpaid public agency volunteers from the FLSA’s
definition of “employee”); FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“The FLSA makes a special exception . . . for individuals who volunteer to perform services for a state or local government
agency . . . [and] for individuals who volunteer their time . . . for charitable, civic, or humanitarian
purposes to non-profit organizations.”).
52 This conclusion follows directly from the notes following the test that state, “If all of the
factors listed above are met, an employment relationship does not exist under the FLSA, and the
Act’s minimum wage and overtime provisions do not apply to the intern.” FACT SHEET, supra
note 33 (emphasis added). Interestingly, however, Judge Pauley diverged from this particular
aspect of the Fact Sheet and instead opted for a “totality of the circumstances” approach. Glatt, 2013
WL 2495140, at *14.
53 FACT SHEET, supra note 33.
TRY OF
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In addition to the test, the Fact Sheet expounds on some of the criteria in
supplemental paragraphs. For instance, the first paragraph explains the part
of the test that deals with the internship’s educational aspect. It reads as
follows:
In general, the more an internship program is structured around a classroom or
academic experience as opposed to the employer’s actual operations, the more
likely the internship will be viewed as an extension of the individual’s educational experience (this often occurs where a college or university exercises oversight
over the internship program and provides educational credit). 54

C. Flaws of the Fact Sheet
Despite addressing the growing criticism about unpaid internships, the
Fact Sheet still requires improvement because (1) the informative paragraph’s
language about the legality of unpaid internships where the intern receives
college credit is misleading and unsupported by evidence, (2) the conjunctive test is unnecessarily complex because the first, third, and fifth prongs
are just derivatives of the second and fourth prongs, and (3) the fourth
prong’s immediacy requirement ignores the substantial long-term and
delayed-realization benefits that unpaid interns confer on employers.
First, judges or employers may be misled by the Fact Sheet’s discussion
of college oversight. The Fact Sheet states that internships in which the intern
receives educational credit are more likely to be viewed as a permissible
“extension of the individual’s educational experience,” further noting that
“this often occurs where a college or university exercises oversight over the
internship program and provides educational credit.”55 This language
implies that a significant number of internships for college credit are legal.
Thus, because of this paragraph, an employer—or judge—may believe that
an intern’s receipt of school credit is sufficient to render an unpaid internship
legal, and therefore, the employer can derive a benefit from that intern.
This assumption, however, is incorrect. The fourth prong of the test
mandates that the employer receive “no immediate advantage” from the
intern, regardless of whether that intern is having an educational experience. 56
Further, “educational environment” and school credits are distinct concepts. A

54
55

Id.
Id. (emphasis added). It is important to note that, since the Department of Labor does not
track information on unpaid internships, the word “often” is not supported by the Department of
Labor’s available data. Steinberg, supra note 41, at 2 (noting that the Department of Labor keeps
no record of unpaid internships).
56 FACT SHEET, supra note 33.
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student can receive credits from her college but nevertheless work in an
environment that is far from educational. For instance, her school may give
her three credits to intern for a newspaper, but her work may consist solely
of running personal errands for the editor.
Second, on a more general level, this test is overly complicated because each
prong—other than the second and the fourth—is really just supplemental to
the broader question of whether the relationship entails mutual benefits.
The first prong pertaining to education, for example, cannot be a sufficient
test in itself; it can instead only be an indicator of whether the relationship
primarily benefits the employer or the intern (which is the issue in the
second and fourth prongs). If the workplace environment resembles a
classroom setting, this is evidence that the employer is helping the intern
without benefitting himself. Similarly, with respect to the third prong
regarding displacement, if the intern displaces regular workers, this fact
would be evidence that the intern is conferring a benefit upon the employer
by cutting his labor costs. And finally, if the intern is hired for a trial period
with the expectation that the employer will later hire her on a permanent
basis (per the fifth prong), this fact would support the conclusion that the
employer was trying to get a free ride on the training portion of the employment relationship.
Third, the Fact Sheet’s final flaw is the use of the word “immediate” in
the fourth prong.57 This adjective is problematic because it permits unpaid
internships where the intern, though he may not provide an immediate
advantage to the employer, nevertheless confers a long-term advantage on
the employer. Examples of such long-term advantages include improving an
employer’s goodwill with clients, the community, and universities, and
providing industry-wide, cost-free training.
Under the current Fact Sheet, employers are able to derive these longterm benefits, while the interns remain unpaid and still have no basic
protections against harassment or discrimination. There should not be a
distinction between immediate and future advantage. In both cases, unpaid
interns are increasing employers’ bottom lines.
To understand how these long-term advantages may occur, consider a
hypothetical. Suppose an employer, ABC Investments, is located in a central
New Jersey suburb and hires ten unpaid interns each summer. Of these ten
interns, eight are sophomores from Princeton University, and the other two
are children of wealthy clients. This hiring practice generates long-term
advantages for ABC.
57 See id. (“The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from
the activities of the intern.”).
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First, ABC generates goodwill with universities by hiring sophomores
from one of the most prestigious universities in the United States. This
relationship will promote the ABC brand among graduating students
applying for full-time jobs, enabling ABC to attract some of the nation’s top
talent. Second, ABC generates goodwill with the community by hiring
students from a nearby school. People in the community will presumably
hear about this practice, feel a stronger connection to ABC, and be more
prone to seek the firm’s services. Third, ABC generates goodwill with
wealthy clients by hiring their children to fill the remaining spots. ABC has
thereby increased the loyalty of these clients, assuring that they will remain
with ABC or even increase their business with the firm.
Furthermore, if these low-cost unpaid internships are prevalent in the
industry, ABC and firms like it may avoid training costs. For example, even
if ABC does not directly guarantee each of its interns a full-time job after
the internship (which would make the firm compliant with the fifth prong
of the Fact Sheet’s test), ABC will most likely hire employees with similar
internship experience. Likewise, similar firms may hire some of ABC’s
previous interns.58 Hence, rather than have to hire a new employee and
train her for, say, $2000, firms in the industry can hire previous interns who
have already been trained for free. Thus, all such unpaid interns are working
for the industry as a whole and thereby each firm within it.
D. Negative Effects of Unpaid Internships
The adverse consequences of unpaid internships include financial detriment
to interns, discriminatory benefits among different socioeconomic classes,
an increase in the unemployment rate, and a lack of workplace harassment
statutes protecting interns.
1. Financial Detriment to the Intern
Though the harm to an intern’s finances from an unpaid internship may
be obvious, consider the following real-world example.
Felicia Melvin was a communications student at Cabrini College, near
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.59 When she landed an unpaid internship with
58 See Joseph E. Aoun, Protect Unpaid Internships, INSIDE HIGHER ED ( July 13, 2010),
http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/07/13/aoun (“[Seventy-five] percent of employers
prefer job candidates with relevant work experience[ and m]ore than 90 percent prefer to hire
interns or co-ops who have worked for their organization.”).
59 Emma Jacobs, Do Unpaid Internships Make Sense for Students?, NEWSWORKS ( July 6, 2012),
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local//business-a-economy/41042-do-unpaid-internships-makesense-for-students.
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CBS in New York City, she was happy to work for such a well-respected
company.60 Felicia avoided the prohibitive costs of renting an apartment in
New York City by remaining in Philadelphia, and instead woke up at five
o’clock in the morning to take the bus every day.61 In the office, “she worked
in the creative services department, mostly putting together promos.”62
The main expenses Felicia incurred were transportation and opportunity
costs. First, with respect to transportation, she spent $34 each way for her
bus ticket.63 Assuming she worked three times a week for a ten-week
summer, her bus tickets would total $2040 (not including parking at the bus
station, gas to drive to and from the bus station, and subway fare between
the station and CBS).
Felicia also incurred significant opportunity costs. Rather than receive
no income, she could have earned $12 per hour as a waitress.64 If she had
waitressed eight hours per day, three days per week during this same tenweek timeframe, she would have earned $2880 and netted this sum less
driving costs. In taking the CBS internship, then, Felicia realistically lost
almost $5000.65
This scenario, however, becomes more complicated when Felicia does
not have the $2040 for Greyhound bus tickets. In this hypothetical, Felicia
must actually get a second job to pay for her unpaid internship. This
situation may not be uncommon, at least at Cabrini College, where the
career services counselor states, “Our students are working sometimes two
and three jobs . . . [because] in order to do a co-op or internship, they need
income.”66 If we take a second look at the opportunity costs of Felicia’s
internship—assuming she does not have the capital for traveling to and
from New York City—we find that her costs are actually greater than just
revenue from waitressing less transportation costs. In fact, because she must
now have a side job to pay for the CBS internship, the opportunity costs
also include the benefit she could have gained from doing productive
activities during the time she now spends at that job. More simply, in the
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
Id.
Estimating Felicia’s exact expenses is complicated because she completed her internship a year
ago, and transportation costs fluctuate. The current price is $34 for a one-way ticket on a Greyhound
bus. See Philadelphia: Traveling from Philly to NYC, TRIP ADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com/Travelg60795-c3501/Philadelphia:Pennsylvania:Traveling.From.Philly.To.Nyc.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
64 For simplicity, I make the assumption that Felicia could actually get a job as a waitress at
$12 per hour.
65 See Steinberg, supra note 41 (“Even with the recession, students are willing to dish out
hundreds, or even thousands, of dollars to cover expenses for internships far from home.”).
66 Jacobs, supra note 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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scenario where she works only as a waitress, she works twenty-four hours
per week. But in the scenario where each week she works twenty-four hours
each with CBS and as a waitress, she has twenty-four fewer hours in her week
that could be spent on her studies or on recreational activities.
One could, of course, view Felicia as an extreme example because most
interns do not travel from Philadelphia to New York City every day.
Though even in less extreme cases, the interns incur transportation costs
and similar opportunity costs. Additionally, some interns, unlike Felicia,
may choose to live in the city of their internship, which means that the costs
of the internship include transportation, living, and opportunity costs—a
sum presumably even greater than Felicia’s.
2. Unfair Advantage to Wealthier Students
Another effect of unpaid internships is that they favor wealthy students
at the expense of economically disadvantaged ones because (1) student debt
is not uniform and (2) some students have parents or other third parties
who will pay for the costs of the internship.67
Regarding the first point, the average student-loan debt of borrowers in
the undergraduate class of 2011 was $26,500, a 5% increase from the previous
year.68 In addition, almost two-thirds of students with a bachelor’s degrees
graduate with debt—some with significantly higher debt than the average.69
Furthermore, the interest rate for Stafford Loans is currently 3.86% for
undergraduates and 5.41% for graduate students,70 and student loans are
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.71
It also follows, however, that one-third of students have no debt at all.
Due to this disparity, students with debt have an incentive to get paying jobs
as opposed to unpaid internships, because they seek to pay off their loans as
soon as possible to realize the full value of their eventual salaries. Likewise,
they have a disincentive to take unpaid internships because such uncompensated positions do nothing to reduce the size of their nondischargeable
student loan debt.
67 See Brann & Isaacson, supra note 42 (“The Obama administration has expressed concerns
about unpaid internships, commenting that the practice may be abusive and unfair because lessaffluent students can’t afford to spend a summer working as an unpaid intern.”).
68 Tamar Lewin, Student-Loan Borrowers Average $26,500 in Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2012,
at A22.
69 INST. FOR COLLEGE ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE PROJECT ON STUDENT DEBT AND THE
CLASS OF 2011 (2012), available at http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/classof2011.pdf.
70 Stafford Loan Interest Rates, STAFFORDLOAN.COM, http://www.staffordloan.com/staffordloan-info/interest-rates.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
71 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
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Regarding the second point, some students’ families can subsidize their
cost of living during an internship or even pay for consultants to help them
obtain one.72 If we turn back to Felicia’s situation, and this time assume she
has a wealthy family, she would not have to worry about taking, let alone
paying for, a Greyhound bus because her parents would pay for her apartment in NYC, her meals, and her subway fare. As a result, the cost–benefit
analysis of whether to take the position at CBS or to work as a waitress would
weigh heavily in favor of CBS because of the position’s long-term benefits.
The eventual consequence of these disparities in loan debt and parent
subsidization is that wealthier students have a greater ability to take unpaid
internships. Accordingly, they have a competitive advantage in their respective industries from better work experience and connections over students
who took paid positions at local golf courses or restaurants.73 Thus, the
unpaid internship, though meant as a means of education, in fact becomes a
mechanism for impeding intergenerational class mobility.
Moreover, from an economic standpoint, this feature of unpaid internships is unsettling because it means that the U.S. labor market rewards those
from privileged upbringings, as opposed to those with merit, which renders
our labor pool less competitive and efficient.74 This inefficiency could result
in higher prices to consumers and disadvantage U.S. companies relative to
their foreign competitors.
3. Increase in Unemployment Rate
Another effect of unpaid internships is that they will eventually increase
the unemployment rate. To cut costs, employers will hire unpaid interns and
thereby displace paid employees, who will then add to the number of
unemployed workers in the labor force.75 Rising costs of healthcare and
other employee benefits will only exacerbate this tendency, because they
make hiring a paid employee even more expensive, increasing the incentive

72 See Sue Shellenbarger, Do You Want an Internship? It’ll Cost You, WALL ST. J. ( J an. 28,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123310699999022549.html (noting that some parents pay
$5000 to $9500 for internship consultants to help their children find internships).
73 See Greenhouse, supra note 9 (“[C]ollege graduates with wealthy parents who can underwrite
their living costs during their internships get a leg up because they get a head start with coveted
employers . . . . But college grads whose parents cannot support them say they often have to turn to
an $8.50-an-hour job at McDonald’s or Target and cannot afford to take an unpaid internship.”).
74 See Pologeorgis, supra note 38 (stating that unpaid internships hurt the labor market “by
undermining the job allocation based on meritocracy which rewards people for their skills rather
[than] their socioeconomic background”).
75 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 4.
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to hire unpaid interns.76 Furthermore, employers have ready access to these
interns, especially in economic downturns, because students want relevant
professional experience to give them an advantage in their post-graduation
job hunt.77 This large supply makes finding unpaid interns easy and provides
employers a constant flow of free labor. This flow then permanently displaces
the full-time employee(s) who would otherwise be doing that work. 78
Real world examples support this point. A freshman from Connecticut
worked as an unpaid intern at a university close to his home.79 There, his
supervisor gave the interns a stack of files, which they then input into a
computer database. “We were doing a lot of the work that people there were
getting paid to do,” the young man says.80 “Basically, we just got thrown in.
A couple of people had been fired, and we had to do their jobs.”81
Alex Footman’s story also corroborates this trend. While working on
Black Swan, he and the other unpaid interns filled coffee pots, took out the
trash, got lunch for the staff, and cleaned the office.82 Rather than pay
assistants to get lunch and coffee or janitors to take out the trash and clean
the office, the studio exploited these Hollywood-hopefuls’ need for experience by replacing paid employees with unpaid interns. When situations like
these are aggregated, the result is that more people are working for free and
fewer people are working for money.83
4. Lack of Protection Against Discrimination and Harassment
A final negative consequence of unpaid internships is that they do not
afford interns the same legal rights as employees.84 For example, unpaid
76
77

See id.
See Pologeorgis, supra note 38 (stating that high unemployment causes students to “flock to
unpaid internships in hopes of transitioning to a full-time paid job” or to gain experience to make
themselves more desirable candidates in a crowded labor market).
78 See id. (“[I]nternships are supposed to be recruiting pipelines . . . . Instead they are being
used as a way to free labor where employers . . . cycl[e] through interns without any intent to hire
them on a full-time basis.”).
79 Fulham, supra note 40.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Greenhouse, supra note 1.
83 There has been no convincing hard research to correlate unemployment and unpaid internships. The link, however, seems intuitive based on a basic grasp of supply and demand. I also
concede that there may be positive economic arguments for unpaid internships—for instance, that
they decrease costs to consumers by decreasing labor costs. But this argument is one that could be
made for eliminating minimum wage laws in general. The economics of unpaid internships,
however, is outside the scope of this Comment.
84 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 1 (“[A] lack of clear regulation . . . leaves
many interns unprotected by workplace discrimination and harassment statutes . . . .”).
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interns are not protected by workplace and discrimination statutes such as
the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.85 More specifically, unpaid interns are
not considered “employees” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
due to their unpaid status.86 This lack of protection leaves interns particularly
vulnerable to harassment, because they are “generally on the lowest rung of
a workplace hierarchy.”87
For instance, Bridget O’Connor was an unpaid intern at “Rockland, a
hospital for the mentally disabled.”88 There, her supervisor continually
abused her by repeatedly calling O’Connor “Miss Sexual Harassment,”
suggesting that they have an “orgy” with other women, and telling
O’Connor to remove her clothes before a meeting.89 O’Connor’s eventual
lawsuit, however, was dismissed because her unpaid status meant she was
not an employee.90
O’Connor’s story shows that unpaid interns, hoping to have beneficial
learning experiences with employers that will make them attractive candidates for paid positions, are sometimes subject to harassment and discrimination, yet have no recourse in the judicial system.
E. Why Unpaid Internships Persist
Even under the Fact Sheet’s murky six-prong standard, it is clear that
some unpaid internships are outright illegal.91 Marra Green’s internship,92
for example, which involved Christmas shopping and returning clothes for
her boss, violates the Fact Sheet’s test for three reasons. First, Marra’s tasks
immediately benefitted her boss. Second, her experience taught her nothing
about the fashion industry. And third, her internship did not resemble an
educational environment.93 Nevertheless, internships like Marra’s continue
to exist throughout the country because of the unequal bargaining power
85
86

Id.
See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Where no financial benefit is
obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no ‘plausible’ employment relationship of
any sort can be said to exist because . . . [compensation] is an essential condition to the existence
of an employer–employee relationship.”).
87 Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 3.
88 O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 113.
89 Id. at 113-14.
90 Id. at 115-16.
91 See Greenhouse, supra note 38 (“[M]any employers failed to pay even though their internships did not comply with the six federal legal criteria that must be satisfied for internships to be
unpaid.”); see also supra Section I.C.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
93 For the full six-prong test, see supra text accompanying note 49.
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between the intern and the employer and inadequate oversight by the U.S.
Department of Labor.
One reason for the unequal bargaining power is that the recession has
hit young college graduates hard. Indeed, the unemployment rate for
college graduates in 2011 was 8.8%, and this number does not even take into
account students who chose to attend graduate school but preferred to be
working.94 Moreover, of the young graduates who were employed in 2011,
37.8% had jobs that did not require a college degree, which depressed their
wages.95 These statistics are particularly problematic in light of the more than
$26,000 in loan debt the average 2011 graduate carried.96 The ultimate result of
this weak labor market and high debt load is that young Americans will do
whatever they can to get ahead—even work for free.97
It is no secret that employers prefer candidates with prior experience.98
A 2010 job outlook survey reported that “75 percent of employers prefer
candidates with relevant work experience[, and m]ore than 90 percent
prefer to hire interns or co-ops who have worked for their organization.”99
Another study found that “[a]pproximately 42 percent of graduates with
internships who applied for a job received an offer compared with only 30
percent for students who had no internship experience.”100 As a corollary,
interns do not have the power to request the minimum wage because, if they
do, their employer will just hire someone else for free.101

94 Mark Memmott, Tough Times, Even Higher Debts for College Graduates, NPR (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/10/18/163137239/tough-times-even-higher-debts-for-collegegraduates.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Jacobs, supra note 59 (“For many college students and recent graduates, one of the most
attractive paths into the workforce has become an internship, often unpaid.”).
98 See Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Realities: The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2617 (1998) (noting that a catch-22 exists in the job
market where “[e]mployers tend to hire only experienced personnel, but college graduates possess
little applicable experience”). But see Jordan Weissmann, Do Unpaid Internships Lead to Jobs? Not for
College Students, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/
06/do-unpaid-internships-lead-to-jobs-not-for-college-students/276959 (noting that, according to a
recent survey of students who received at least one job offer, only 1.8% more had previously held
an unpaid internship than those who had never held an internship).
99 Aoun, supra note 58.
100 NAT'L ASS'N OF COLLS. & EMP’RS. (NACE), NACE RESEARCH BRIEF: 2010 STUDENT S URVEY 4 (2010), available at http://www.naceweb.org/research/student_survey_brief.
101 See Steinberg, supra note 41 (“‘It’s frustrating,’ [one student] says. ‘I know they’re not
going to pay me because I know there’s always somebody who would take this instead of me.’”).
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Another explanation for the continuance of unpaid internships is that
there is little oversight.102 In the Labor Department, investigations are
“complaint-driven.”103 The problem with this is that interns have an incentive
to keep their unpaid internships and thus a disincentive to report abuses.
They believe these internships will increase their chances of getting a paid
full-time job. But at the same time, they worry about the personal repercussions for being a whistleblower. They fear that if they alert the Labor
Department or personally file a lawsuit, their reputation in the industry will be
sullied, or their employers will fire them or withhold a recommendation.104
Furthermore, because so many students want unpaid internships, potential
whistleblowers may feel like any action taken would be futile since other people,
willing to put up with the illegal violations, would readily take their place.105
II. MY PROPOSAL
To clarify and simplify the Fact Sheet, I propose that judges borrow the
contract law doctrine of consideration to determine whether an intern is in
fact an employee or a volunteer. Specifically, judges should ask whether the
employer offered the unpaid internship to receive a benefit from the
intern.106 If such a bilateral exchange of consideration occurred, a valid
contract was formed, and the relationship was one of employer–employee.
If, on the other hand, the employer offered a gratuitous promise (e.g., “I’ll
give you work, and I don’t expect to benefit from it myself ”), the relationship is one of employer–unpaid intern.
I do not propose, however, that the current six-prong test be discarded
altogether. Instead, I recommend that the first, third, and fifth prongs107 be

102 See Greenhouse, supra note 38 (“Many regulators say that violations are widespread, but
that it is unusually hard to mount a major enforcement effort because interns are often afraid to
file complaints.”).
103 See Jacobs, supra note 59 (stating that “investigations remain complaint-driven” and that
“[t]he Labor Department . . . still does not track intern cases”).
104 See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (“Unpaid interns are usually too scared to speak out and to
bring such a lawsuit because they are frightened it will hurt their chances of finding future jobs in
their industry.”); Jacobs, supra note 59 (“Melvin[, an unpaid intern,] did think sometimes she
should get paid, but wanted a recommendation and she felt intimidated.”).
105 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 2 (“The crucial role of internships in
obtaining later employment and the highly competitive market for placement means that no one
student has an incentive to report their employer, even in cases of blatant abuses, since another
student will readily work for free.”).
106 That the intern is expecting to receive a benefit from the employer—most likely an intangible benefit such as experience, connections, or credentials—is presumed.
107 As a reminder, the first prong is, “The internship . . . is similar to training which would
be given in an educational environment;” the third prong is, “The intern does not displace regular
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converted into nondispositive factors that will help the trier of fact determine whether there were mutually induced promises.108 Because these
factors are ways of determining whether the relationship comprises mutual
benefits,109 removing them will create a simpler, more condensed test for
judges. I incorporate the second and fourth prongs110 into my overarching test
to show that a benefit to the intern or the employer is a way of demonstrating
a bilateral exchange of consideration. Finally, the sixth prong111 should not
be treated as a factor, but instead as a threshold question. If the employer
and the intern did not understand that the intern was to work for free, then no
additional analysis is necessary, because there was never a meeting of the minds.
In summary, I propose the following steps to test for the legality of
unpaid internships:
1.

Did both parties understand that the internship would be unpaid?112

2.

Did the employer offer the position to receive a benefit113 from the
intern? The emphasis here is ex ante. The question is whether the
employer sought to receive a benefit from the intern, not whether a benefit
was actually conferred.114

employees, but works under close supervision of existing staff;” and the fifth prong is, “The intern is
not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship.” FACT SHEET, supra note 33.
108 By “mutually induced promises,” I mean two promises that are caused by each other. For
example, A promises to pay B in exchange for B painting A’s house. A’s promise to pay B is caused
by B’s promise to paint his house, and vice versa.
109 By “mutual benefits,” I mean a situation in which both parties accrue advantages that
would not have occurred had the employment relationship not existed.
110 The second prong is, “The internship experience is for the benefit of the intern,” and the
fourth prong is, “The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from
the activities of the intern; and on occasion its operations may actually be impeded.” FACT
SHEET, supra note 33.
111 The sixth prong is, “The employer and the intern understand that the intern is not entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.” Id.
112 The employer and the intern both must have understood that the intern would not be
entitled to wages for the time spent in the internship.
113 Note that, contrary to the Fact Sheet, I do not use the adjective “immediate.”
114 There will be evidentiary problems in discovering the employer’s ex ante intent. Such
problems, however, also beset the factfinder in any criminal or civil trial that requires a finding of
intent. Factors helpful in making this determination include (1) whether the internship was similar
to training given in a classroom, (2) whether the intern displaced regular employees, (3) whether
the employer promised the intern a job at the conclusion of the internship, and (4) whether the
employer did, ex post, receive a benefit—though none of these is dispositive. The burden of proof
is on the defendant to show that the exchange of consideration was actually unilateral on his part.
Putting the burden of proof on the defendant is consistent with my earlier interpretation of the
Fact Sheet. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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Did the agreement entail a bilateral exchange of consideration? If it did,
a valid employment contract was formed and the intern is, in fact, an
“employee” deserving at least a minimum wage, an overtime rate, and
protections against discrimination and harassment.115 If the agreement
did not entail a bilateral exchange of consideration, then it is instead a
gratuitous promise, and the intern is a “trainee” entitled to no wages.116

III. APPLICATION OF MY PROPOSAL
In this Part, I apply my proposal to hypothetical unpaid internships.
A. Situation 1: Blatant Illegality
Molly is a student at a premier fashion institute, and she just had a conversation with Sophia, the president of XYZ Fashion Company (XYZ).
Sophia told Molly that she could work for her over the summer for forty
hours each week. Sophia would not pay Molly, but Molly would be able to
learn about the fashion industry and would have a great name to put on her
resume. Molly agrees, but over the summer, she is disappointed by her
work. Molly checks Sophia’s mail, makes coffee for the office, takes lunch
orders, cold-calls department stores to ask if they will carry XYZ’s products,
and sweeps the floors at the end of every day. In fact, during two particularly
busy weeks, Molly works ten hours each day. At the end of her internship,
she files a lawsuit against XYZ.

115 Note that, under my test, even if an intern did not receive wages, she could still be entitled to sexual harassment protection. This logic is in contrast to the logic employed by the court in
O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 113 (2d Cir. 1997). There, the court held that, because the intern
was unpaid, she was not protected under sexual harassment statutes. Id. at 119. I argue that, in
cases like this, if the internship fails my test, the plaintiff could sue not only for back pay, but also
for violations of harassment statutes because she should have been paid wages. That she was
wrongfully not paid should not ruin her sexual harassment claim.
116 I avoid the question here of whether legally unpaid interns should be protected against
workplace sexual harassment. In the Second Circuit, they are not protected. See supra subsection
I.C.4. However, both legislative chambers in Oregon recently passed a law protecting all unpaid
interns from harassment and discrimination. See Kristian Foden-Vencil, Oregon Bill to Protect Unpaid
Interns from Harassment, Discrimination, OPB (June 5, 2013), http://www.opb.org/news/article/oregonbill-to-protect-unpaid-interns-from-harassment-discrimination; see also Ortner, supra note 98, at 2645
(arguing that unpaid interns should receive protections under Title VII because they are “employees” since they receive nonmonetary compensation). This topic, while relevant, is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
I concur with Ortner and believe that if there is a bilateral exchange of consideration, there is
a valid employment contract and the intern is an “employee.” Therefore, as an employee, the
intern deserves the protection of harassment and discrimination laws, even if judges refuse to
mandate that such employment contracts warrant monetary consideration.
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This example is the most clear cut. Put simply, Molly will win her civil
suit. Nevertheless, I apply my test step by step.
First, we must ask, “Did Molly and Sophia understand that Molly was
to work for free?” Yes, both the employer and Molly understood this fact in
their preliminary conversation.
Second, we must ask, “Did Sophia offer the internship to Molly to receive
a benefit from the internship?” Factors helpful in making this determination
are (1) whether the internship was similar to training given in a classroom, (2)
whether the intern displaced regular employees, and (3) whether the employer promised the intern a job at the conclusion of the internship. Yes, the
benefit to Sophia here is very clear. A work environment that entails making
coffee, taking lunch orders, and sweeping floors is nothing like the classroom
environment of Molly’s premier fashion institute, where the professors speak
about how to create clothes and jewelry that match seasonal trends and
satisfy consumers. Additionally, it seems obvious that Molly is doing the
work of a janitor and a secretary and is thereby displacing a paid worker
who could be, or perhaps was, employed by Sophia. No employment was
promised to Molly, but this fact alone is not enough to overcome the
overwhelming evidence that Sophia hired Molly to receive Molly’s work
product without paying her in return.
Under my test, Molly is entitled to at least the minimum wage of $7.25
for every hour she worked up to forty hours a week and then $10.88 for the
forty-first to fiftieth hours she worked in the two particularly busy weeks.117
If Sophia or another employee had harassed or discriminated against Molly,
she would also have standing to bring a harassment or discrimination suit.
B. Situation 2: Latent Illegality
Molly, Sophia, and XYZ are the characters again, and Sophia and Molly
have the same conversation in which they agree that Molly is not to be paid.
This time, however, they stipulate that Molly will not be sweeping floors or
answering phones. Instead of hiring a paid consultant for XYZ’s busy
summer, Sophia has hired Molly as an intern to do substantive, challenging
work. During her time, Molly works with a team of eight people in the “Fall
Trends” department, and Molly is treated just like every other employee.
She comes up with new designs for necklaces and earrings (her specialties)
and helps conceive marketing plans for XYZ’s fall catalogue. Molly’s hours
are the same as in the previous example.

117

See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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Here, our intuition changes from the previous example, and we feel more
comfortable with the internship—most likely because Molly is receiving
increased intangible consideration in the form of experience.118 The outcome,
however, is the same as in the previous example: the internship is illegal.
As a threshold matter, Molly and Sophia both understand that the internship is unpaid. So again, the core issue is whether there was mutually
induced consideration.119 To test this, we ask whether Sophia expected to
receive a benefit from Molly. Molly’s expectation of a benefit is presumed.
Recall, the focus is on the parties’ ex ante expectations.
In this scenario, Sophia seems to have offered Molly the internship to
receive a benefit from her. Rather than hire a creative consultant for the
summer, whom Sophia would have to pay, she hired Molly for free, expecting
Molly to confer a benefit upon the company through her creativity and
work product. Contractually, Sophia’s promise to provide Molly experience
induced Molly’s promise to provide product ideas and marketing schemes to
Sophia—and vice versa.120 Thus, because we have a bilateral exchange of
mutually induced consideration, we have a valid employment contract that
deserves at least the minimum wage and that gives Molly standing to file a
harassment or discrimination lawsuit.
C. Situation 3: Superficially Unsettling Illegality
The preliminary agreement is the same as that of the previous example
(no pay), and the kind of work Molly does is also the same. What changes in
this situation, however, is Molly’s work product. Her jewelry and necklace
designs are hideous, her loud singing in the office is a constant distraction,
and her rudeness offends the customers who enter the premises. In fact,
Sophia tells her to leave two weeks before the conclusion of the summer.
In this situation, intuition tempts us to believe that Molly deserves no
compensation because Sophia has been harmed by Molly’s internship, yet
Molly can still benefit from the relationship by putting the prestigious XYZ
name on her resume. Here, however, our intuition leads us astray.

118 Note, though, that some people may be even more uncomfortable with this scenario than
the previous one because Sophia is receiving more valuable work from Molly. Nevertheless,
intuition is not the focus of this Comment.
119 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981) (“A performance or return
promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by
the promisee in exchange for that promise.”).
120 Even though Molly received increased intangible consideration, nonmonetary compensation does not satisfy the minimum wage laws of the United States. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006
& Supp. V 2012) (requiring wages of $7.25 per hour or more).
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Again, the first step is not a problem because both Molly and Sophia
understood the internship was unpaid. As for the second step, however, a
careful look at the language is necessary. The key inquiry is whether the
employer offered the unpaid internship to receive a benefit from the intern.
The emphasis is not on whether actual benefit was conferred upon the
employer, but instead on whether the employer, ex ante, sought a benefit.
Situations 2 and 3 demonstrate why this emphasis is proper.
Any employer, in making a hiring decision, is taking a risk. Ex post, an
employee might have benefitted the firm or hurt it. Regardless, the employee—
in this case, the intern—deserves at least a minimum wage because this risk
is properly placed on the employer since it is the employer who stands to
benefit from such hiring decisions. For instance, let us presume that Sophia
will hire one hundred people over the next five years, and that she makes
her decisions after a two-round interview process. These five years show
that ninety of the employees each conferred a net benefit of $1000 to XYZ,
but ten of the employees each caused a net loss to the firm of $1000. Therefore, in total, Sophia’s hiring practice benefitted her firm by $80,000.
In fact, Sophia rationally undertook those ten bad eggs and their resulting
$10,000 cost to XYZ. For example, suppose that Sophia could have 100%
accuracy in hiring competent individuals, but that this accuracy would entail
a four-round interview process that would cost her an additional $25,000.
Therefore, if she chose this four-round interview process, she would have
one hundred persons, each providing a $1000 benefit to XYZ, but because of
the high costs of achieving 100% accuracy, the net benefit would be only
$75,000—$5000 lower than the alternative scenario in which she had chosen
ninety competent persons and ten incompetent persons.
Thus, Sophia should be required to pay for Molly’s internship, even
though Molly’s work was unproductive, because Sophia consciously and
rationally undertook that risk. In fact, Sophia benefits from the reward of
that risk over the course of time.121 To hold contrarily would be to allow
Sophia to freeride on her choice of interns until they proved themselves worthy.

121 This logic is similar, though not identical, to Marvin Chirelstein’s analysis of mutual
mistakes, where he states that

the dealer calculates that he will lose $ X through misappraisals unless he spends $ X
plus $Y to hire another appraiser. Since the cost of employing additional personnel
exceeds the expected benefit, the dealer wisely decides not to take that step. But having
made that decision, he cannot also claim that he has made a ‘mistake’ and should be
permitted to rescind . . . .
MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 169
(6th ed. 2010).
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Now, a complication to this scenario is that the Fact Sheet uses the language
“immediate advantage.”122 One could arguably construe this situation as not
providing Sophia with an “immediate” advantage; Sophia would only
benefit in the long run from her hiring scheme. I, however, eliminated the
“immediate” language from my test because it could conceivably prevent
employers from having to pay interns in situations such as these and bring
about other complications that I will discuss later.123
In conclusion, Molly would be entitled to the same damages as before
(minus the two weeks she did not work due to her dismissal) and would
have standing to bring harassment and discrimination lawsuits.
D. Situation 4: Simple Legality
Here, we have a similar preliminary agreement in which Molly and Sophia
understand that Molly is not to be paid and not promised a full-time job.
This time, the internship proceeds differently, and Molly shadows Sophia
throughout the day. Molly sees how Sophia talks to clients, why she chooses
to market jeans A over jeans B, how she deals with her employees, and
generally how the fashion industry works. In fact, during the summer,
Sophia stays late some days telling Molly about how she got started in the
industry and Molly often interrupts Sophia’s work with her questions. On
the last day, Molly gives Sophia her consummative project: a new necklace
design, but Sophia does not, and never intended to, include it in her
catalogue and only gives Molly constructive criticism on it.
Applying my proposal, we find that this unpaid internship is legal.124 Ex
ante, Sophia expected no benefit from Molly; indeed, Sophia did not even
anticipate receiving a work product from Molly. Molly’s capstone project,
while relevant to XYZ, was really just a training exercise. Indeed, Sophia
was even hurt by hiring Molly, because Molly’s questions interrupted her
workflow and because Sophia spent time talking to Molly that she could
otherwise have spent working. Molly, on the other hand, received a great
benefit because she can put XYZ on her resume and she has learned how to
be successful in the fashion industry from an expert.
Another crucial point here is that Sophia did not promise Molly a fulltime job at the conclusion of the internship. If she had, one could make the

122
123

See FACT SHEET, supra note 33.
For a more detailed discussion regarding my omission of “immediate,” see supra subsection II.A.2.
124 To avoid redundancy, we presume hereafter that both parties understand the internship is
to be unpaid.
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argument that Molly should be considered an employee because Sophia
expected to receive a benefit from the internship: a cost-free training period.
E. Situation 5: Unexpected Benefit
This situation has the same premise as the previous one except that, one
day, while Sophia is showing Molly the new fall catalogue, Molly suggests
making the primary dress orange instead of purple. Sophia likes the idea
and, at the last minute, changes the color of XYZ’s main dress of the season
to orange. The dress flies off the shelves, and XYZ, as a result, sees a 10%
increase in revenue.
Though this scenario is complicated, if we adhere to the test, the outcome is clear. First, we ask whether Sophia offered the position to Molly to
receive a benefit from the internship. The answer is that, ex ante, Sophia
merely intended for Molly to be her shadow and, indeed, expected Molly to
sometimes hinder her work—as occurred in Scenario 4. Ultimately, however, Molly conferred an unexpected benefit upon Sophia.
Our analysis, though, must remain rigid and focused on the ex ante intentions. Actual benefits can be evidence of the employer’s ex ante intentions,
but they are not dispositive. If we look at the facts of the situation, it is clear
that Sophia initially offered Molly the internship and the experience that
came with it with no expectation of reciprocal benefits—in essence, it was a
gift. What demonstrates this intention is that Sophia required Molly to
shadow her throughout the summer.
Molly, for her part, conferred her benefit upon Sophia unexpectedly;
Sophia never bargained for it. Indeed, the color idea can be construed as an
unexpected gift from Molly’s standpoint, so the entire situation is best
thought of as the exchange of two unconnected gifts—in contractual
language, as gratuitous promises that were not mutually induced. The
scenario of the unexpected benefit, therefore, passes my test, and the unpaid
internship is legal.
F. Situation 6: Conditional Gratuitous Promise
Our final situation is a complicated one, and to illustrate it properly, we
need new characters. Now, we have Gary, an owner of a construction
company, and Fred, a young man hoping to be a carpenter. In a conversation,
Gary tells Fred, “I’ll show you the ropes of being a carpenter, but I think
that, to really learn the trade, you have to do real work. To help you out, I’ll
give you some very small projects on my construction sites, and I’ll watch
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over you to make sure you do them correctly, even though it will mean less
time for me to watch over my other guys.”
Applying our test here is complex and requires close attention to the
precise language. Again, the second step is to examine whether the employer
offered the position to receive a benefit from the internship. The vital word,
in this situation, is “to” because it goes to the employer’s motive. In essence,
“to” refines the question to ask whether the internship’s potential benefit
induced the employer’s promise of an internship.
In this scenario, Fred has secured an internship through Gary’s good
will. Fred is conferring a benefit upon Gary—doing these small projects that
Gary might have otherwise had to do himself—but Fred’s conferred benefit
does not seem to have induced Gary’s promise.125 In other words, Gary did
not give Fred the internship so that Fred could do small projects; Gary gave
Fred the internship simply to help Fred. It just so happens that a condition
for Fred to receive the gratuitous gift—Gary’s supervision and guidance—is
that Fred must confer some benefit upon Gary—doing the small projects,
which help him learn to be a carpenter. In contractual language, Gary gave
Fred a conditional gratuitous promise. Under my test, this unpaid internship is valid because the condition to Gary’s promise was just that—a
condition—and not full-blown consideration that induced Gary’s promise.
Compliance with theoretical formalities, however, does not always bode
well for practical application. Here, it seems the employer could often raise
the assertion that the benefit received by him was not bargained for; it was
just a condition to the gratuitous promise. More bluntly, the employer may
be able to abuse the conditional-gratuitous-promise defense by saying
something like, “The intern had to confer a benefit upon me in order to
learn; I did not actually care about that benefit.”
If this defense is raised, however, we can overcome its potential abuse by
applying a comparative cost–benefit analysis.126 An employer’s receipt of
125 Again, there will be evidentiary problems in discovering Gary’s ex ante intent, but not
more than in any criminal or civil trial that requires a finding of intent. Factors helpful to making
such a conclusion include whether the employer—ex post—receives a comparative cost–benefit
advantage, whether the intern displaced a regular employee, whether the work environment was
educational in nature, and typical kinds of evidence like emails, phone calls, and in-person
conversations that display the true purpose of the relationship.
126 See Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 4 (claiming that the proper test for the
legality of unpaid internships is whether “the per-hour cost to the employer of an intern . . . [exceeds]
the per-hour benefit to the employer of an intern” (emphasis omitted)).
Though I think this test has great merit, in my view, it should be confined only to situations
wherein the defense asserts that the employer really only offered a conditional gratuitous promise.
Later, I discuss the danger of using it as the sole test for the legality of unpaid internships. For
present purposes, I do not think that the “per-hour” metric is necessary and instead believe that a
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some net benefit could be strong evidence that his promise actually was
induced by the potential benefit of the internship, and therefore the intern
is actually an employee who deserves a wage and protections against
workplace discrimination and harassment. For the employer to receive a net
benefit, the net difference between the costs and benefits of not having an
intern must exceed the net difference between the costs and benefits of
having an intern. Formulaically, B1 - C1 > B2 - C2.127
I next apply this formula to our situation. For argument’s sake, there are
ten projects for the internship, and they would each take Gary, who earns
$50 an hour, thirty minutes. Each project, therefore, costs Gary—without
Fred—$25. In total, they cost Gary $250. Fred, however, takes three hours to
complete them. To make sure they are done properly and Fred is learning,
Gary dedicates one hour personally to each one. For Gary with Fred, then,
each project costs $50 in Gary’s labor plus the replacement value of any materials Fred ruined during his learning curve, which comes to an average of $10 per
project. Gary’s total cost of Fred’s internship, therefore, is $600, which exceeds
the $250 cost of the small projects if Gary had not hired Fred.
In sum, though Gary received Fred’s labor, which can be construed as a benefit, Gary did not receive a net advantage. Rationally, this lack of a net advantage
supports (though does not prove)128 the conclusion that Gary did not bargain for
the consideration; it was merely a condition to his gratuitous promise.
Therefore, this situation would pass my test because there was no mutually
induced consideration. There was no exchange, and thus there was no valid
contract that makes the intern an employee who deserves at least minimum wage.

total cost–benefit analysis, ignoring hourly timeframes, is more appropriate. Moreover, note that
my test is distinct because Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s test focuses only on costs. See infra
Section III.B.
127 For this formula, B1 is the benefit for the scenario with an intern, while B2 is the benefit
for the scenario without an intern. C1 is the cost for the scenario with an intern, while C2 is the
cost for the scenario without an intern.
128 No one factor or evidentiary consideration is dispositive. Rather, this inquiry will be more
of a balancing test, which considers the totality of the circumstances. Again, other useful
evidentiary factors are whether the intern displaced a regular employee, whether the work
environment was educational in nature, and the typical kinds of evidence like emails, phone calls,
and in-person conversations that display the true purpose of the relationship.
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IV. CHALLENGES
A. Challenge 1: Perversion of Contract Law
Though I suggest that judges borrow from the law of contracts, my proposal
runs counter to it because it calls for supernormal consideration.129 Essentially,
the formation of a contract requires a bargain, to which the parties mutually
assent, and consideration, which can most simply be thought of as “the receipt
by the promisor of ‘something of value’ from the promisee.”130
The beauty of the doctrine of consideration is that it is in accord with
the human spirit. In the words of Adam Smith,
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this: Give
me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning
of every such offer . . . . It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to
their own interest.131

The same reasoning applies to unpaid internships. Though the interns are
not receiving money, they are still acting in their own self-interest. In
exchange for providing the employer with their work product, they are
receiving experience, connections, and credentials for their resumes—all of
which will aid them in their eventual search for a paying job.132 Under the
bargain theory of consideration, then, unpaid internships are valid contracts
because each party—the employer and the intern—receives a benefit for
which they bargained: the employer gets work from the intern, and the
intern gets experience, a line on a resume, and networking opportunities
from the employer.
The Fact Sheet, the FLSA, and my test can be seen as unfairly favoring interns because they require employers to provide supernormal consideration—
that is, on top of an intern receiving intangible benefits like experience,
129 By “supernormal consideration,” I mean consideration that is not necessary for the parties
to come to an agreement. For instance, if A promises to paint B’s house and B promises to wash A’s
car in return, forcing B to pay A an additional sum would constitute supernormal consideration.
130 CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 121, at 12. A famous example of a unique mutual consideration
situation is the case of Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). There, Hamer’s uncle said that if
Hamer did not smoke or drink until he was twenty-one, he would give him $5000. Id. at 256.
Hamer fulfilled his end of the bargain, so the court awarded him $5000—the return consideration
for Hamer’s consideration of not smoking or drinking. Id. at 259.
131 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 21-22 (London, Strahan & Cadell, 5th ed. 1789) (1776).
132 See Jacobs, supra note 59; NACE, supra note 100 (finding that individuals who have held
internships are “considerably more likely to receive a job offer than their counterparts who did not
have any experiential education in their background”).
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connections, and credentials, he must also receive at least $7.25 per hour. In
this sense, my test is perverse to contract law because it casts aside otherwise
valid, mutually beneficial agreements and demands that they include monetary
consideration to be legal. Because the premise of contract law is that mutually
beneficial contracts create a net gain to society and thus increase the aggregate
welfare,133 the Fact Sheet and my test can be viewed as inhibiting such an
increase, because they prohibit some mutually beneficial contracts.
Though my proposal does deviate from traditional contract law, my goal
is merely to borrow the doctrine of consideration, not to adhere to contract
law completely. Ultimately, through my proposal, I seek to clarify and
simplify the Fact Sheet so that judges have a workable standard to use when
addressing the legality of unpaid internships. Moreover, policymakers have
decided that nonmonetary consideration alone cannot satisfy the minimum
wage.134 Therefore, though a bilateral exchange of consideration between an
employer and an intern wherein the consideration conferred upon the intern
is intangible may be valid under contract law, it contradicts the FLSA and
thereby the policies Congress has established for our country.
B. Challenge 2: Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s Proposal Is Superior
In Not-So-Equal Protection: Reforming the Regulations of Student Internships,
Kathryn Anne Edwards and Alexander Hertel-Fernandez propose a test for
the legality of unpaid internships in which a court would “compare the perhour cost to the employer of an intern (through supervision and training)
relative to the per-hour benefit to the employer of an intern (through an
intern’s production).”135 Under their proposal, if the cost exceeds the benefit,
133 See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 121, at 2 (asserting that a contract “is a kind of joint undertaking which increases the wealth of both parties and from which both emerge with a measure of
enhanced utility”).
134 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring wages of $7.25 per hour or
more). It is worth asking, though, whether the use of nonmonetary consideration, such as prestige,
is increasing in our country and perhaps should be considered valid under the FLSA. For example,
a law student choosing to work for the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore over Cahill Gordon
& Reindell exemplifies this choice. Each year, some top law students choose to work for Cravath
over Cahill, despite Cahill’s superior compensation, presumably because Cravath provides them
with superior intangible benefits like prestige and experience. See Elie Mystal, Associate Bonus
Watch: Cahill Gordon DESTROYS the Cravath Bonus, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 8, 2010, 5:16 p.m.),
http://abovethelaw.com/2010/12/associate-bonus-watch-cahill-gordon-destroys-the-cravath-bonus
(“[S]ome Cahill Gordon associates are going to take home total bonus money that’s $35,000 . . . more
than Cravath associates.”). In this respect, one could argue that students are rationally choosing to
forego monetary income and are instead opting for prestigious unpaid internships that carry
advantageous nonmonetary consideration that will benefit them in the long run—just as some paid
workers forego extra income to receive seemingly more valuable intangible benefits.
135 Edwards & Hertel-Fernandez, supra note 43, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
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the relationship is that of employer–intern; if the benefit exceeds the cost,
the relationship is that of employer–employee, meaning that the intern
should be compensated under the FLSA.136 In addition to this test, Edwards
and Hertel-Fernandez also retain prongs one, three, five, and six (the
prongs not pertaining to the primary beneficiary of the relationship) of the
Fact Sheet.137 Though this idea has merit, retaining the first, third, and fifth
prongs renders it underinclusive, too focused on actual costs as opposed to
expected costs, impractical, and overly complicated.
First, this test is underinclusive because it only focuses on the costs to
the employer without considering the benefits. In their analysis, Edwards
and Hertel-Fernandez assume that the benefit an intern confers upon her
employer is equal to the cost to the employer of a comparable hire.138 In the
simplest example, if an intern is working forty hours per week, doing work
that the employer would otherwise have to hire a $10 per hour employee to
do, the employer is benefitting $400 per week from the internship. Therefore,
under Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s test, the internship would require at
least the minimum wage.
Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez, however, rightly recognize that the costs of
an internship are not as simplistic as those of the previous example.139 They
therefore provide the following hypothetical:
Because of the intern’s lack of experience, a regular worker must spend half
of his time observing the intern’s work. If the regular worker’s normal compensation is $25 an hour and he normally works 40 hours per week, then the
total cost to the employer of having the intern is $3,500. If the intern works
40 hours a week for seven weeks, and the wage of a comparable worker is
$10 an hour, then the benefit to the employer is $2,800. In this case, the cost
($3,500) exceeds the benefit ($2,800) so the intern does not legally have to
be compensated, assuming that the other four tests were also met.140

In line with their test, the authors view benefit only as the cost of hiring a
comparable worker. This definition, however, is overly narrow because it
ignores benefits like goodwill with the community, goodwill with clients,
goodwill with the intern’s school, and industry-wide unpaid training.
To further my argument, I tweak Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s
hypothetical such that the cost of a comparable worker is $12.49 per hour
136
137

Id.
See id. (“We propose applying a new, straightforward, quantitative test to two of the most
ambiguous but most important elements of the guidelines: points two . . . and four . . . .”).
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 5.
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and make the employer an investment management firm. After this change,
the cost of having the intern remains at $3500 due to the cost of supervision, but
the costs of not having the intern have risen to $3497.20 ($12.49 per hour ൈ 280
hours). Still, this hypothetical passes their test because the cost of having the
intern exceeds the cost of not having one by $2.80 ($3500 (the cost to the
employer of having an intern) - $3497.20 (the cost of not having an intern)).
Now, let us apply the above calculation to the facts of my previous hypothetical concerning ABC Investments. ABC is located in a suburb of central
New Jersey and hires ten unpaid interns each summer, eight of whom are
sophomores from Princeton University and two of whom are the daughters
of wealthy clients. By having this hiring practice in place, the firm operates
at an immediate loss of $28 per summer (-$2.80 per intern ൈ 10 interns);
however, this scheme generates considerable goodwill for the company with
respect to Princeton University, the community, and clients, and provides
industry-wide, cost-free training.
Thus, using Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s concept of “cost,” ABC’s
unpaid internships are valid because they impose a net cost to ABC of $28
per summer, but in reality, the unpaid internships may increase ABC’s
bottom line by tens of thousands of dollars in the long run.141 As a result,
their test is underinclusive in that it would not prohibit exploitative unpaid
internships that confer great benefits upon employers, because it focuses
only on costs, not benefits. My mutually induced consideration test, to the
contrary, would forbid such exploitative internships because it takes into
account both costs and benefits. Under my test, ex post benefits from
unpaid internships, like long-term increases to an employer’s profits, can be
evidence of an ex ante intent to receive a benefit from the intern.
Second, their test is flawed because its focus is only ex post as opposed to
ex ante. Under an ex post review, interns could receive unequal treatment
depending on their level of production.142 For example, hypothetical
Hometown News hired John and Nancy as unpaid interns, expecting them to
confer a benefit upon Hometown News by doing free editing. The cost of hiring
a paid editor would be $10 per hour, and they each work ten hours per day. Thus,
the “benefit” to Hometown News under the Edwards and Hertel-Ferndandez
141 To arrive at the “thousands of dollars” conclusion, I assumed that the investment firm
would have paid each intern $7.25 per hour, 40 hours a week, ten weeks a year. Because there are
ten interns in the hypothetical who are working for free, that amounts to a savings of $29,000.
Even this figure, though, is conservative. The firm would also be benefitting from better services
and more clients, most likely resulting in lower costs and more revenue.
142 The heart of this critique of Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez’s test is identical to my discussion of why the focus in my test is whether, ex ante, the employer sought a benefit. See supra
Section III.C.
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test is $200 per day (2 ൈ ($10 ൈ 10 hours)). The monitoring cost to
Hometown News differs depending on the intern, however. John requires
no monitoring, but Nancy requires five hours of attention from Dave, the
supervisor, who makes $40 per hour. Thus, John’s net benefit is $100 per day
to Hometown News, but Nancy’s net benefit to Hometown News is $0 per
day ($100 benefit - ($20 monitoring costs ൈ 5 hours)).
Ex post, therefore, John would require payment under the Edwards and
Hertel-Ferndandez test, but Nancy would not—even though, ex ante,
Hometown News anticipated deriving a net benefit from both interns. This
result eliminates Hometown News’s risk of hiring incompetent interns,
which is problematic because it is saving money in the long run by reducing
due diligence costs.
Third, their test is impracticable. The defendant in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. proposed a similar “‘primary benefit test,’ [which would
require] determining whether ‘the internship’s benefits to the intern outweigh the benefits to the engaging entity.’”143 The court rejected the
proposal, calling it “unmanageable.”144 Judge Pauley of the Southern District
of New York reasoned that such a test is “subjective and unpredictable”
because “the very same internship position might be compensable as to one
intern, who took little from the experience, and not compensable as to
another, who ‘learned a lot.’”145
Finally, the Edwards and Hertel-Fernandez test is overly complicated
because it retains the first, third, and fifth prongs of the Fact Sheet’s test. As
I previously discussed, these prongs are unnecessary because they are
derivatives of the second and fourth prongs, which deal with the costs and
benefits of the internship. The third prong is particularly redundant in this
context, since it asks whether the intern displaces a regular employee,146 and
their test requires that the cost of a comparable employee be calculated.
Under their test, then, if a comparable employee would be more costly than
an unpaid intern, the intern necessarily displaces a regular employee,
rendering the third prong superfluous.
In conclusion, though calculating the costs to the employer of having
and not having an intern may be useful in determining the ex ante motivation of the employer for the purposes of my test, Edwards and HertelFernandez’s overall proposal is flawed because it does not take into account
143 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11-6784, 2013 WL 2495140, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2013).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See FACT SHEET, supra note 33 (“The intern does not displace regular employees, but
works under close supervision of existing staff.”).
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important benefits like goodwill and reduced training costs that unpaid
interns confer upon employers. Furthermore, the notion that this comparative
cost test should be used in conjunction with the first, third, and fifth prongs
of the Fact Sheet is overly complicated and redundant.
CONCLUSION
While working on Black Swan, which grossed over $300 million, Alex
Footman took out the garbage, swept floors, and got coffee for the crew.147
For his efforts, he received no compensation.148 Natalie Portman, the film’s
lead actress, received $2 million.149 My proposal is not that Alex should
make as much—or even a tenth as much—as the Oscar-winning Portman. I
only suggest that he receive at least $7.25 per hour and have standing to
bring a harassment or discrimination lawsuit.
The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”150 “Employ,” under FLSA, means to “suffer or permit to work.”151
The court in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co.,152 however, narrowed this
definition so that “employ” does not “make all persons employees who,
without any express or implied compensation agreement, may work for their
own advantage on the premises of another.”153 In response to heightened
criticism of unpaid internships, the Department of Labor released the Fact
Sheet to clarify when an intern is an “employee” deserving minimum wage
and overtime rates.
This Fact Sheet, however, proposes a complicated and redundant six-point
test accompanied by muddled notes that will make rendering a decision for
judges in upcoming lawsuits unnecessarily difficult, thereby increasing the
chances of incorrect verdicts.154 This risk of preventing legal unpaid internships and especially of allowing illegal ones is dangerous to our society. Legal
unpaid internships, if prevented, will deprive our labor force of an effective
source of training. Illegal unpaid internships, if allowed, will financially hurt
interns, distribute discriminatory benefits among different socioeconomic
147
148
149

Greenhouse, supra note 1.
Id.
Dan Sabbagh, Natalie Portman Sparks Hollywood Battle, GUARDIAN: ORGAN GRINDER BLOG
(Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.guardian.com/business/organgrinder/2011/mar/16/natalie-portman-actor-fee.
150 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006).
151 Id. § 203(g).
152 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
153 Letter from Wage and Hour Division, supra note 32.
154 See Wang v. Hearst Corp., No. 12-0793, 2012 WL 2864524, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012)
(certifying a class action lawsuit against the Hearst Corporation for allegedly violating minimum
wage laws by not paying or underpaying interns).
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classes, increase the unemployment rate, and fail to provide interns with
statutory protection from workplace discrimination and harassment.
To avoid these problems, I propose a simpler, cleaner test for judges to
use. If the employer and intern expect, ex ante, to receive a benefit from one
another, then a valid employment relationship has been formed. This
relationship deserves at least the minimum wage and gives standing to the
intern to file a harassment or discrimination lawsuit. If only the intern
expects to receive a benefit, then the employer is conferring a gift upon the
intern, and the intern need not be paid.155
The primary advantage of my proposal is that it gives judges an easy to
use, accurate test that will reduce costs to society such as a higher unemployment rate, an inefficient work force, and interns who are unwarrantedly
burdened with steep financial costs. Furthermore, my hope is that if this
test creates meaningful judgments against employers who are exploiting
interns, more unpaid interns will surmount the fear of retribution and
launch lawsuits against their employers, and companies will be deterred
from installing illegal unpaid internship programs in the first place.

155 Again, in this Comment, I avoid the issue of whether the intern should nevertheless have
standing to sue on harassment or discrimination grounds despite being a legal unpaid intern.

